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The dramatic rise in litigation among former law partners is a
well-documented feature of the legal profession’s landscape. An impressive body of law underlying lawyer mobility has developed in the
relatively short period during which law partner litigation has become commonplace.1 With each reported decision, the litigation has
yielded substantive legal standards regulating the relationships of
partners associated in a law practice.2
An important theme emerging from the lawyer mobility litigation
is the primacy of the interests of clients in resolving disputes among
former law partners. No other consumer class can match clients of
law firms in terms of protections accorded by law. Already intense
competition for clients has been bolstered by rigorous enforcement of
bans on anticompetitive practices by law firms. The law firm cannot
secure its investment in a client through a long-term contract bind-

* © 2003 by Robert W. Hillman. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.
1. See generally ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY (2d ed. Supp.
1998).
2. See, e.g., Robinson v. Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1997) (sharing of fees);
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft v. Beasley, 728 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (expulsion); Phil Watson, P.C. v. Vacey & Peterson, L.L.P., 650 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa 2002) (client
solicitations); Graubard, Mollen, Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y.
1995) (client solicitations); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 50 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989) (contractual restraint on competition); Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 393
A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978) (interference with contracts).
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ing the client to the firm.3 The law firm cannot impose economic penalties on those who leave the firm and take its clients.4 And more to
the point, the law firm cannot enforce against departing members
contracts that in any way limit those members in competing for the
firm’s clients.5 Litigation has not been kind to law firms seeking to
protect their client base.
One of the casualties of this short but intense period of litigation
among former law partners is the traditional notion that a law firm
enjoys a proprietary interest in its clients. A little more than twenty
years ago the Pennsylvania Supreme Court chastised lawyers who
took cases from a firm by noting that “[n]o case on the list, however,
was [theirs]. Rather, each case was [a firm] case on which . . . [they]
were working.”6 Indeed, a lower court judge in the same case put it
even more succinctly: “If they want their own firm, let them get their
own clients.”7 The Pennsylvania cases speak the language of the past.
If the subsequent explosion of lawyer mobility litigation has demonstrated anything it is that neither law firms nor attorneys within the
firms may claim clients as their own. In short, neither firm nor lawyer has a proprietary interest in clients.
Although the view of clients as property of the firm is no longer
part of the lawyer mobility landscape, there exists a variation of the
property approach that may have some vitality. Law firms, like other
professional service organizations, develop knowledge relating to
their practices. For want of a better term, this may be referred to as
the intellectual property of law firms,8 a term that may include, for
example, client lists, billing data, form files, compensation practices,

3. See, e.g., In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072-73 (N.Y. 1994) (voiding a nonrefundable retainer agreement because it “inappropriately compromises the right to sever
the fiduciary services relationship with the lawyer”).
4. See, e.g., Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 148 (N.J. 1992)
(voiding partnership agreement varying payouts depending upon whether departing partners took clients and employees from the firm).
5. See generally HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 2.3.3.
6. Epstein, 393 A.2d at 1177.
7. Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 382 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (Spaeth, J., concurring) (emphasis added), rev’d, 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978).
8. It seems to be standard practice in commentary on “intellectual property” not to
define the meaning of the term. See, e.g., PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1994); MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (4th ed. 1999). As the term is here used, law firm intellectual property
simply means nonpublic information (i.e., information not generally known or readily ascertainable) that has value to the firm. The issue of whether the particulars of the firm’s
rights in such information are protected by law, however, is another issue. Cf. DONALD A.
GREGORY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1 (1994) (“Intellectual
property is an intangible that is not easily described. The law creates the property by defining what will be protected from others. Intellectual property is created and protected
based upon policy considerations as to what types of intellectual activities should be encouraged.”).
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and personnel information.9
The status of a law firm’s information and the right to control its
use are issues of great practical importance. In an environment in
which “portable” business drives lawyer mobility,10 a firm entertaining the possibility of hiring a lateral partner likely will want to know
something about the partner’s clients, billings and income as well as
the resources that will be required in order to support the lawyer’s
practice. Information needs grow and become more complex when the
partner proposes to move an entire team (partners, associates, paralegals, etc.) from one firm to another. Whether one more person or
many are involved in the move, there remains the larger issue of
whether information acquired while at one firm may be used after affiliation with a new firm.
There exist a variety of legal doctrines relevant to a lawyer’s use
of information acquired while a member of a law firm. The fiduciary
duties of partners and, in the case of associates, employees may bear
on the activities of withdrawing lawyers before and after they leave
their firms. The difficulty with fiduciary standards, however, lies in
the indeterminacy of their application.11 In Gibbs v. Breed, Abbott &
Morgan, for example, a New York appellate court took a harsh view
of law partners who shared with another firm.12 They were contemplating joining information on associate salaries and billing.13 Signaling the difficulty of issues pertaining to the use of firm information,
however, Gibbs included a forceful dissent that found nothing at all
inappropriate about sharing such data with another firm.14 Fiduciary
duties are more likely to be indeterminate when used to define rights
in information than they have been in when used to order other aspects of the relations among law partners.
Although fiduciary duties are the logical starting point for evaluating the conduct of partners who utilize for private benefit informa9. Normally, rights in intellectual property are transferable. Insofar as information
relates to client matters, however, law firms operate under restrictions that have effectively eliminated the option of selling the property. More recently, a number of states have
amended their ethics rules to allow, under defined circumstances, the sale of the goodwill
associated with a law practice. The easing of restrictions follows the 1990 amendment of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to allow lawyers to buy and sell law practices
when certain conditions are satisfied. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17
(2001); see HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 2.5.3.
10. See HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 1.1.
11. The indeterminacy problem and a suggested role for fiduciary norms are explored
in Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51 (2000).
12. 710 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
13. The information included salaries, annual billable hours, and billing rates. Id. at
580. The partners planned to recruit the associates to their new firm. Id.
14. Id. at 590 (Saxe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with
the majority as to the confidentiality of the information disclosed and calling the information “the greatest unkept secret in the legal profession”).
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tion they acquire while at a firm, firms seeking redress may be expected to employ the distinct but compatible body of law governing
trade secrets. They will receive considerable support for this effort
from the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, the first state high court opinion to conclude that a
law firm’s client list may be a trade secret.15 Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Siegel is that the trade secret analysis has come so
late to the world of lawyer mobility litigation. Now that it has arrived, we may expand allegations of trade secret misappropriation so
that it will become a routine part of litigation among former law
partners.
Whether viewed through the lens of fiduciary norms or trade secret protections, one of the more important and unresolved issues
raised by lawyer mobility trends is the extent to which a law firm has
a recognizable interest in the information pertaining to clients that it
possesses. If such an interest exists and is protected by law, the information may properly be regarded as the intellectual property of
law firms. In settings outside of the legal profession, disputes over information rights typically are limited to two claimants—the original
possessor of information and the party who presently desires to use
the information. In the law firm setting, however, a third party—the
client—is introduced, and in most respects the interests of this party
are superior to those of either the firm or its departing partner.
This Article explores the nature of information about clients generally and client lists specifically as the intellectual property of law
firms. It examines whether client information is protectible as a
trade secret and the extent to which fiduciary norms preclude use of
such information by withdrawing partners.
I. TRADE SECRETS
A. In General
Trade secret law recognizes and protects some types of valuable
business information.16 As one court put it, “[t]he trade secret is a
type of intellectual property, in effect, a property right in discovered
knowledge.”17 In core concepts, this is ancient law, traceable at least
to Roman times.18 In its Anglo-American development, trade secret
law is closely connected with norms of commercial morality. Indeed,
15. 707 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio 1999).
16. See, e.g., Kozuch v. CRA-MAR Video Ctr., Inc., 478 N.E.2d 110, 114 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (describing trade secrets as “valuable assets to any business”).
17. Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981).
18. A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law; The Actio Servi Corrupti,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1930) (discussing an action available in response to a third party
enticing a slave-employee to divulge business secrets).
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one commentator stated it well:
Imagine for a moment a commercial society that has never heard
the term “fiduciary obligation,” and where no one owes duty of fair
play to anyone else. . . . A moment’s reflection about such an
abominable business climate leads to the recognition of practical
reasons for the development of the law of trade secrets.19

Reflecting the substantial common law jurisprudence on trade secrets, the Restatement (First) of Torts, promulgated in 1939, stated
that an individual “who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if . . . his disclosure or
use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in
disclosing the secret to him.”20 The common law underpinnings of
trade secret law are now reflected in statutes that have been adopted
in most states. For the most part, the statutes implement the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which defines a trade secret as follows:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.21

Information is not a trade secret simply because the person or
firm in possession of the information regards it as confidential.22 Factors relevant to according information the status of a trade secret include:
the extent to which the information is known outside the business
and by employees and others involved in the business, the measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information, the information’s value to the employer and to competitors,
the resources the employer expends in developing the information,

19. MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1.03 (2000). Mr. Jager also notes, however, that a useful definition of trade secrets “is not readily discernable from the cases.” Id.
§ 2.01.
20. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939) (emphasis added). The section also
states that liability exists if the trade secret is discovered by improper means. Id. A more
current restatement of trade secret protections is offered in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995).
21. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
22. See generally Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap: Protecting “Confidential Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841
(1998).
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and the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others.23

Also relevant to this equation is a balancing of the “conflicting
rights of an employer to enjoy the use of secret processes and devices
which were developed through his own initiative and investment and
the right of employees to earn a livelihood by utilizing their skill,
knowledge and experience.”24 To some extent, the product of this balancing may be seen in authority that would disable the employer
from barring use of the information if the employee is able to derive
the information through independent invention or “reverse engineering” (i.e., starting with the trade secret and working backward to find
the method by which it was developed).25
B. Customer Lists as Trade Secrets
Information concerning the consumers of a firm’s products or services may be valuable business information. In some cases, the information may have value to the firm, or a competitor, even if it offers little more than the names and contact information of individuals with whom the firm has had a business or professional relationship.
Although only a small number of states that have adopted the
UTSA expressly apply the act to a list of actual or potential customers26 or the equivalent, many jurisdictions have, through case law,
applied trade secret precepts to protect customer lists.27 Moreover, as
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition states, “[t]he general
rules that govern trade secrets are applicable to the protection of information relating to the identity and requirements of customers.”28
Of course, not all customer lists are trade secrets. Customer lists derived from readily-identifiable sources may not be protected, although specific information concerning customers (such as contact
persons or special needs) may qualify as a trade secret even when the
list does not.29 Moreover, firms may have a particularly difficult time
in preventing the use of client information by individuals having

23. Robert S. Weiss & Assocs., Inc. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216, 224 (1988).
24. Kenawee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
25. Id. at 476.
26. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-761(4) (Harrison 1994).
27. See, e.g., Am. Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(giving trade secret protection to credit insurance underwriter’s customer list); Stampede
Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (giving trade secret protection to an automotive tools and equipment distributor’s customer list).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. f (1995).
29. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 8, at 206.
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close relationships with the clients.30
In part because trade secret status may be defeated by nondefinitional factors such as the failure to take steps to maintain the secrecy
of information,31 the line between those customer lists that are trade
secrets and those that are not is blurred.
C. Law Firm Client Lists as Trade Secrets
1. Law Practice and Information “Used in One’s Business”
By defining a trade secret as “any formula, pattern, device, or
compilation of information which is used in one’s business,”32 the Restatement of Torts seemed to exclude protection for information that
has value but is not actually used in a business.33 For years, debate
has ensued over whether the practice of law is a business or a profession, and depending on where one stands in this debate the Restatement, read literally, may negate the status of information in the possession of law firms as trade secrets. For two reasons, however, the
distinction between a business and profession should have little effect on the trade secret analysis. First, the view that law practice to a
significant extent is a business (albeit with the underpinnings of a
profession) has gained the upper hand in recent years.34 Second, and
more to the point, the UTSA drops the “use in business” portion of
the definition of a trade secret, leading to the perhaps unintended effect that protection under the statutes may extend to information
used in non-business ways.35
2. The “Independent Economic Value” of Client Information
To qualify as a trade secret under the UTSA, information must
derive “independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
30. See Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 179 Cal. App. 3d 124, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that names of clients employees had worked for prior to their withdrawal from accounting firm were not trade secrets).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 76-81.
32. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
33. But cf. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (defining a trade secret
as “information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise”).
34. Consider, for example, the widely followed American Lawyer rankings of firms on
the basis of profitability per partner. America’s Highest-Grossing Law Firms in 2001, 24
AM. LAW. 203 (July 2002).
35. See, e.g., ALCES & SEE, supra note 8, at 83-84.
[O]ne may have a secret method for applying paints to model airplanes and use
that purely for hobby purposes. There are many other hobbyists who might
wish to have such information if it were available and, therefore, this method
would derive significant economic value from not being generally known. Under
the Uniform Act, such information would appear to qualify as a trade secret;
under the Restatement it would not.
Id.
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means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”36
Normally, the identity of law firm clients is readily apparent and
often even is a matter of public record. For this reason, information
concerning the identity of a specific client normally is easily ascertainable with a minimum of effort and should not qualify for trade
secret protection. As is the case with the customer list of a commercial enterprise, the real value of client information lies in the list.
The longer and more complex the list becomes, the greater is the difficulty of independently creating the information. The very difficulty
in the recreation is one element of the value of the client list.
Difficulty of replication is not the sole determinant of the value of
the information contained in a client list. The relationship that exists
or existed between a firm and its clients distinguishes the firm from
countless other firms which may wish to compete for the attentions
of the clients and provide noisy communications to this effect. The relationship is of value not only to the firm but also to any of its members whom clients may identify as forming part of that relationship.
The goodwill associated with the relationship may be used to good
advantage by a lawyer within the firm who wishes to solicit the client. Indeed, in some cases, the client may have greater allegiance to
the soliciting lawyer than to the firm.37 Even when the relationship
between soliciting lawyer and client is more attenuated, however, a
departing lawyer or former member of the firm may use successfully
the relationship between the firm and the client as the basis for the
lawyer’s solicitation attempts. For this purpose, a client list may be
of real assistance to the soliciting lawyer.
The potential value of the client list is greatest when the number
of clients is large and, therefore, the information reflected on the list
is extensive. Consider, for example, the strategic use of a client list in
an early and infamous lawyer mobility case. In the case cited earlier
in this Article as a paradigm of the now-defunct clients as assets of
the firm view, lawyers in the firm notified approximately four hundred of the firm’s clients that they were forming a new firm and that
the clients were free to retain counsel of their choice.38 The contacts
were by phone as well as letter. Although the associates had worked
on the client matters, the use of a client list undoubtedly facilitated
the communications. The case illustrates the value of client lists in
practices involving large numbers or relatively unsophisticated clients.
36. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 45-46.
38. See Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 382 A.2d 1226, 1228 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1977), rev’d, 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978).
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For practices of this type, client lists may seem to possess the requisite “independent economic value” to justify protection as trade secrets. This assumes, however, that a law firm is no different from
other commercial enterprises in its entitlement to trade secret protection for client information. Although there is growing acceptance
that law partnerships are profit-seeking firms, they do operate under
unique ethics standards designed to protect the consumers of their
services. As is discussed below, these standards may limit significantly trade secret protections that may otherwise be available.
II. THE LEGAL ETHICS PERSPECTIVE
Norms of legal ethics have shaped the ground rules that regulate
the relationships of lawyers associated in law firms. In particular,
the principle of client choice, which allows clients to freely discharge
lawyers or firms, undermines the expectations of firms regarding
continued client patronage and loosens the bonds that tie lawyers associated in law practices.39 Interestingly, law is unique among the
professions in the degree to which the will of clients is a paramount
value in shaping ethics norms,40 although it should be emphasized
that the policy reason supporting such a privileged status for consumers of legal services has not yet been articulated.41
Client choice operates to void traditional contractual means of tying clients to firms. The classic contractual device for restraining future competition is the restrictive covenant that prohibits an individual from post-withdrawal competition with a firm. The restrictive
covenant, however, is not an option for law partners desiring to restrain future competition. Courts invariably decline to enforce provisions of partnership agreements that restrict the ability of lawyers to
compete with the firms from which they have withdrawn.42 Even cli39. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.5.2, at 545 (1986) (“It
is now uniformly recognized that the client-lawyer contract is terminable at will by the client. For good reasons, poor reasons, or the worst of reasons, a client may fire the lawyer.”).
40. See, e.g., Riordan v. Barbosa, No. 395945, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 446, at *21
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1999) (enforcing a restrictive covenant against an accountant
and noting that “[t]here is no per se distinction between so-called professional people and
other members of the work force with respect to the reasonableness of a noncompetition
covenant”). See HILLMAN supra note 1, § 2.3.3 (discussing the legal, accounting, and medical professions).
41. Inexplicably, professional responsibility standards seemingly provide greater protections for clients than provided throughout the counterpart ethics standards of the other
professions. A recent indication of the disparity may be seen in restrictions placed on the
ability of lawyers to take advantage of new firm structures offering limitations of liability.
For a discussion of this point, see Robert W. Hillman, Entity Rationalization and Professional Service Firms, 58 BUS. LAW. (forthcoming August 2003).
42. Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct void restrictive covenants by prohibiting a lawyer from agreeing to restrict
the lawyer’s practice after termination of the relationship created by the agreement.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
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ents who have had retained firms to prosecute litigation on a contingent fee basis may change firms mid-stream and compensate the discharged firms on limited, quantum meruit basis, thus denying the
firms the benefits of the bargains they earlier struck with their clients.43 The ease with which clients may change law firms not only
sets the stage for intense competition for clients but also undermines
any treatment of clients as assets of the firms they presently retain.
Given the environment of intense competition for clients, information concerning the specific clients of a particular firm may be useful
to those who plan to compete with the firm through a future solicitation of its clients. The greatest risk to the firm arises when those who
are planning for future competition are presently members of the
firm and have relatively easy access to the client information. Viewed
solely from the commercial perspective, the information may be protectible as a firm trade secret.44 Introducing the principle of client
choice to the analysis, however, renders problematic trade secret protection for the client list. When broad prohibitions against use of client information operate to restrict choices available to clients, the
firm’s interest in maintaining its competitive position is likely to be
subordinated to the clients’ interest in retaining the law firms of
their choice. Stated another way, the right to control use of information about law firm clients vests at least as strongly in the clients as
it does in the law firms.
There exists a further, deeper-rooted difficulty with extending
trade secret protection to information concerning a law firm’s clients.
A recurring question in professional responsibility is whether client
relationships run to firms or to their lawyers. The canons of ethics
emphasize lawyer-client relationships, while courts commonly assume the relevant relationships are between clients and their firms.45
From the clients’ perspective, the question may be more nuanced
than either the canons or the courts recognize. Clients sometimes
view their relationships as with firms, and at other times with lawyers within the firms. Sophisticated clients seem especially inclined

DR 2-108A (1980). A number of cases have voided contractual disincentives to compensation that fall short of outright restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord,
550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989). See generally HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 2.3.
43. See, e.g., HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 2.3.1; WOLFRAM, supra note 39, § 9.5.2 (1986);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 40(1) (2000) (stating
compensation for a discharged lawyer is limited to the lesser of the fair value of services or
the ratable portion of compensation provided by contract, however a court may award contractually-based compensation if the discharge was not for misconduct, the lawyer has performed severable services, and the award of compensation under the contract would not
burden the client’s choice of counsel).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
45. See ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 44 (1931).
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to “hire the lawyer rather than the firm.”46 The firm’s expectation
that information concerning a client is confidential and will not be
used to the firm’s disadvantage is undermined when the client views
the primary relationship as running to the lawyer rather than the
firm. The weakening of that expectation calls into question the correctness of protecting client lists as law firm trade secrets.
III. THE LAW FIRM CASES
Only sparse case law exists concerning the status of client information as a trade secret. The most important of the reported opinions are the 1999 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Fred Siegel
Co. v. Arter & Hadden, which expressly stated that a law firm’s client list may be a trade secret,47 and Early, Ludwick & Sweeny, LLC
v. Steele, a Connecticut lower court decision that carefully distinguished law firms from commercial enterprises in rejecting claims
that a client list was entitled to protection as a law firm’s trade secret.48
A. Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden
In Siegel, an associate leaving the firm took with her a sixty-three
page list that included the names, addresses, and phone numbers of
hundreds of clients.49 She later used the list to solicit the clients.50
Applying the Ohio statute, the court concluded that the list could be
a trade secret and that issues of material fact made the lower court’s
award of summary judgment for the defendants on this point in error:

46. In a Corporate Legal Times Roundtable, for example, one corporate counsel commented, “[T]he old adage that you don’t hire the firm, you hire the lawyer is so true. And I
want the lawyer who’s working on my matters day-in and day-out to have that service
mentality. It’s just so important to making sure that our needs are met.” Successfully Moving Up: Hiring in Times of Change: Tips for the Restless, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 1996, at
44. The point that clients hire lawyers rather than firms is developed more fully in Robert
W. Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General Principles on the Duties of Partners Withdrawing from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 997, 1011 n.54 (1998).
Generally, the formalities associated with the relationship support the client-law firm
view of the relationship. For example, the law firm’s name appears on pleadings, costs are
advanced by the firm, and billing is in the name of the firm. Even under these circumstances, however, clients may initially or over time consider their relationships as extending more to specific lawyers than to their firms. See, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law
Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review
and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 308 (1997) (citing a survey of Texas lawyers in
which fifty-four percent of the respondents “believe that clients hire individual attorneys
and not law firms”).
47. 707 N.E.2d 853, 864 (Ohio 1999).
48. No. CV980409063S, 1998 WL 516156, at *4-*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 1998).
49. 707 N.E.2d 853.
50. See id. at 861.
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[L]istings of names, addresses, or telephone numbers that have not
been published or disseminated, or otherwise become a matter of
general public knowledge, constitute trade secrets if the owner of
the list has taken reasonable precautions to protect the secrecy of
the listing to prevent it from being made available to persons other
than those selected by the owner to have access to it in furtherance
of the owner’s purpose.51

The court found that issues of material fact existed concerning
whether the firm took reasonable steps to protect its interest in the
list.52 On this point, the record showed that access to the list on a
computer required use of a password and that “[h]ard copies of the
list were stored within office filing cabinets, which were sometimes
locked.”53 The firm’s senior partner testified that he probably had
told employees the information was confidential.54 The defendants,
on the other hand, argued the information was a matter of public record and was capable of being independently created.55
To assist the trial court in determining whether the client list is a
trade secret, the court offered the following guidance:
Where information is alleged to be a trade secret, a factfinder may
consider, e.g., the amount of effort or money expended in obtaining
and developing the information, as well as the amount of time and
expense it would take others to acquire and duplicate the information. . . . The extensive accumulation of property owner names,
contacts, addresses, and phone numbers contained in the Siegel
client list may well be shown at trial to represent the investment
of Siegel time and effort over a long period.
The purpose of Ohio’s trade secret law is to maintain commercial
ethics, encourage invention, and protect an employer’s investments
and proprietary information. That purpose would be frustrated
were we to except from trade secret status any knowledge or process based simply on the fact that the information at issue was capable of being independently replicated.56

Assuming a firm follows the hints offered in Siegel (i.e., it locks
the file cabinet, changes the password frequently, and stamps the
document confidential), it has an arguable claim that a lengthy client
list is a trade secret of the firm. Whether this result is desirable, and
how far the logic of trade secret thinking extends, are distinct and
important questions.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 862.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862-63 (citations omitted).
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As to the desirability of the result, what is missing from the majority’s opinion is any consideration of the interests of clients.57 In
this regard, the purpose for which the information is used should be
considered in assessing the nature of the firm’s rights in the information. For example, a withdrawing lawyer’s use of otherwise protected
information for the purpose of informing clients the lawyer has represented of the lawyer’s change in firm affiliation may be appropriate
in light of the fundamental right of clients to choose their lawyers.
Although the associate in Siegel took a list containing information on
all the firm’s clients, apparently she did so for the purpose of using
the information to contact clients for whom she had worked while at
the firm.58 If that is so, treating the portions of the list used by the
associate as a trade secret of the firm would directly undermine the
ability of clients to choose their lawyers.
An additional fact in Siegel bears emphasis because it suggests an
important limitation on application of trade secret law to client lists.
While at the firm, the associate had maintained a rolodex with information on clients with whom she worked.59 When she left the firm,
she took the rolodex with her.60 The court of appeals held, simply,
that the rolodex “contains the names of clients she worked for and
she could properly retain this information.”61 The firm did not appeal
on this issue.62 If rolodex information is not a trade secret, then it is
likely that information limited to data on clients that the withdrawing lawyer had represented is not protectible as a trade secret, a result that seems eminently sensible.63
There was a spirited dissent in the case. Noting that “[c]lients
may not be reserved to any lawyer or firm as a trade secret”64 in his
dissent, Justice Cook distinguished between the identity of clients
included on a list, which may not be trade secrets, and other information incorporated into a client list. As to the latter, he concluded

57. Cf. Early, Ludwick & Sweeney, LLC v. Steele, No. CV980409063S, 1998 WL
516156, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1998) (“[T]he court finds that the dispute presented
here is not purely entrepreneurial or commercial. The dispute between the parties here is
as to who is entitled to represent the clients concerned. It necessarily implicates the clients’ rights, including their right to choose their lawyers.”).
58. Siegel, 707 N.E.2d at 857.
59. Id. at 856.
60. Id. at 857.
61. Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, No. 71440, 1997 WL 428629, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 31, 1997).
62. Siegel, 707 N.E.2d at 863.
63. See also Sonkin & Melena Co. v. Zaransky, 614 N.E.2d 807, 861 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992) (concluding the firm’s workers’ compensation client list maintained in its computer
data base could be a trade secret but that the firm had failed to prove it had taken affirmative steps to protect the information).
64. Siegel, 707 N.E.2d at 864 (Cook, J., dissenting).
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trade secret law would protect Siegel’s investment in developing
the compilation aspects of its client lists—the cross-referencing of
a given client’s name with parcel numbers, the names of other
property owned or managed by that same client, billing names and
phone numbers, the identity of clients if different from the named
tax plaintiff, the identity of owners of properties, and the contact
people of leased property.65

B. Early, Ludwick & Sweeny v. Steele
In Steele, the withdrawing lawyer contacted sixteen clients he had
represented in pediatric lead poisoning cases while at the firm.66 The
firm asserted “that the names, addresses and telephone numbers,
guardians, blood lead levels, and insurance coverage” constituted a
client list that was the firm’s trade secret.67 The court acknowledged
that a client list may be a trade secret but concluded that the information at issue in this case did not so qualify because the requisite
standard of secrecy had not been satisfied.68 It added:
Defendant Steele acquired the client list by proper means, in the
course of work for plaintiff. Having worked on the cases in question and established relationships with these clients, Steele was
entitled to notify them of his change of employer and to signify his
willingness to represent them if they so desired. . . .
The efforts made by ELS to maintain secrecy of the alleged trade
secrets appear to be no more than the usual precautions taken by a
law firm to ensure clients’ files remain confidential. . . .
....
. . . The central issue in this case—the use by Steele of the client
list—and the relief sought by plaintiff—an order enjoining Steele
from using the list—directly implicate the said clients’ rights to
choose their representation. . . . Were the court to grant the relief
requested, the clients’ right to change counsel would be restricted.
This would clearly be contrary to public policy. . . .
....
The court notes in passing it is highly unlikely that the clients in
question, in choosing ELS to represent them, contemplated that
ELS thus acquired a proprietary interest in their names, addresses, telephone numbers, medical conditions and blood lead levels such as to restrict said clients’ freedom to change lawyers as
the clients see fit.69

In at least two ways, Steele departs from the analysis offered in
Siegel. First, Steele considers the effect on clients of extending trade
65. Id. at 865 (Cook, J., dissenting).
66. Early, Ludwick & Sweeney, LLC v. Steele, No. CV980409063S, 1998 WL 516156,
at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1998).
67. Id. at *3.
68. Id. at *2.
69. Id. at *3-*5.
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secret protection to the client list. In contrast, Siegel offered a more
generic trade secret analysis that might be applied without modification to the client list of an accounting firm or, for that matter, any
commercial venture. As a matter of policy, Siegel’s approach may be
sensible, but the failure of the court to even recognize the elevated
role of client choice in the law firm context disconnects the opinion
from previously unchallenged norms of legal ethics.
Steele also differs from Siegel as to the inclusiveness of the information at issue. In Steele, the client information used by the departing lawyer was limited to sixteen matters for which the attorney had
been responsible while at the firm. In contrast, the Siegel information consisted of sixty-six pages of data that included information on
all of the firm’s clients (numbering in the hundreds). To the extent
information is overinclusive and extends well beyond the clients and
matters handled by the attorney while at the firm, the argument that
client interests preclude protection of the firm’s interest in the information weakens. Stated another way, the differing results in the
two cases may be understood by recognizing that the associate in
Siegel took far more information than was necessary in order for the
clients to be given a reasonable choice of whether they wish to be
represented by the firm or its departed lawyer.
IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE TRADE SECRET FORMULA
AS APPLIED TO LAW FIRMS
The awkwardness of treating a law firm client list as a trade secret becomes apparent upon examination of the conditions for the
protection of information as a trade secret. To be sure, a client list
rather easily may constitute a “compilation”70 as that term is used in
the UTSA’s definition of a trade secret. The Uniform Act’s definition
also includes, however, requirements that information be protected.
The Act requires that the information is not readily ascertainable by
proper means and that efforts have been made to maintain its secrecy.71 Moreover, it is only the act of misappropriation that entitles
the firm to injunctive relief or damages.72 Each of these conditions
merits closer examination.
A. Ascertainability
Courts vary in application of the standard that information must
not be readily ascertainable by proper means. One court has reasoned that time is a factor in this analysis, so that information that
can be reverse engineered only through the expenditure of consider70. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
71. Id. § 1.
72. Id. § 2.
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able time is not readily ascertainable.73 Other courts, however, do not
emphasize time and resource expenditures in the ascertainability inquiry.74 Under either approach, a law firm client list including hundreds of clients, each of whom has a relatively small claim, embodies
information that likely is not readily ascertainable from other
sources.75 As the number of clients decreases, however, the ease with
which reverse engineering may be accomplished increases and trade
secret status of client information becomes more problematic.
B. Efforts to Maintain Secrecy
Both Siegel and Steele properly emphasize that a firm that has
not taken steps to protect the secrecy of client information will be
unable to protect the information as a trade secret.76 As another
court put it in a case involving a commercial customer list, “It would
be anomalous for the courts to prohibit the use of information that
the rightful owner did not undertake to protect.”77
Siegel found summary judgment against the firm was inappropriate in light of the facts that the “client list was maintained on a computer that was protected by a password. Hard copies of the list were
stored within office filing cabinets which were sometimes locked . . .
[and] employees [were informed] that the client list information was
confidential and not to be removed from the office.”78 Because these
measures do not differ from normal precautions taken by firms to
protect the confidentiality of client information independent of trade
secret concerns, Siegel may be suggesting it should be a relatively
simple matter for most firms to satisfy the secrecy condition for trade

73. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 899 (Minn. 1983);
see also ALCES & SEE, supra note 8, § 3.3.1, at 81 (1994) (“The term ‘readily ascertainable’
should be contrasted with the term ‘available after lengthy and expensive efforts.’”).
74. See, e.g., Steenhoven v. Coll. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 458 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984).
75. An example would be the client list of a firm that specializes in worker compensation claims.
76. Cf. Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1985):
Of course the absence of specific confidentiality procedures (whether written or
unwritten) does not itself negate the existence of ‘reasonable’ efforts to maintain secrecy–-all the Act requires. . . . So long as Fleming scrupulously limited
distribution of customer list information to employees and outsiders whose access was necessary to Fleming’s successful pursuit of its business, it must be
deemed to have satisfied the ‘reasonable efforts’ requirement, particularly if
those given access to the information were also advised to preserve its confidentiality . . . .
77. Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1284 (Vt. 2001); see also Surgidev Corp. v. Eye
Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987) (observing that “reasonable” rather than “all
conceivable” efforts are required and concluding that employer took adequate steps to protect the identity of ophthalmologists who were high-volume implanters of intraocular
lenses even though it did not remind departing employees of secrecy of information).
78. Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 862 (Ohio 1999).
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secret status. Such a reading of the case may be errant, however, because the court was simply pointing to the existence of issues of material fact for summary judgment purposes.
An additional measure to preserve the secrecy of client lists not
addressed in Siegel is to include in the partnership agreement or
employment contract specific provisions according trade secret status
to client information.79 At least as applied to information pertaining
to clients with whom an attorney has a past relationship, however,
the enforceability of such contractual provisions is dubious. Contracts restricting the right of a lawyer to practice law are void under
prevailing standards of legal ethics.80 Contracts that seek to prevent
the use of information by withdrawing lawyers are likely to share a
common fate with contracts that impose economic penalties of withdrawing lawyers who compete. In their inability to enforce restrictive
covenants, law firms are at a disadvantage when compared with
other firms and may have comparatively greater difficulty in safeguarding confidential information.81
79. Such agreements may also bolster claims that information has been misappropriated. Cf. Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 664, 679-80 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“While an express confidentiality agreement may certainly suffice to define the duty of confidentiality
necessary for action under Act § 2(b)(2)(B)(II), the existence of such an agreement is not a
prerequisite to such an action. Rather a duty of confidentiality may be implied from the circumstances surrounding the parties’ relationship.”) (citations omitted).
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2001).
81. In Fleming, 611 F. Supp. at 514, for example, the court noted that employers are
not helpless in dealing with employees who leave and take confidential information because “[n]othing prevents such an employer from guarding its interests by a restrictive
covenant.” The employer in the case was a manufacturer’s representative business. In
some jurisdictions, enforcement of a restrictive covenant may be far more difficult than
Fleming suggests. See, e.g., Dougherty, McKinnon & Luby, P.C. v. Greenwald, Denzik &
Davis, P.C., 447 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to enforce restrictive covenant
against former employees of accounting firm in part because it was overbroad and extended to clients for whom they had not worked).
As this Article was going to press, a California intermediate appellate court rendered an
opinion affirming a trial court’s finding that a law firm’s client list was a trade secret that
had been misappropriated by withdrawing partners. See Reeves v. Hanlon, No. GC023679
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B151460.PDF (opinion certified for partial reporter publication; full opinion available at website, partial published opinion available at Reeves v. Hanlon, 106 Cal. App. 4th
433 (2003) (last visited Mar. 27, 2003) (on file with author). As to the firm’s efforts to protect the client list, the appellate court emphasized a number of factors:
[T]he trial court made elaborate findings regarding the Reeves firm’s measure
to protect its client list from outsiders. . . . [The] firm was located in a building
with a security guard; the attorney work area was closed to the public, absent
an invitation, and monitored by receptionists; the client list was stored in a
computer system requiring password access; confidentiality policies regarding
client information were stated in the employee handbook, which was signed by
all employees; and the importance of client confidentiality was discussed at
employee meetings.
Id. at *23. Significantly, the factors emphasized in Reeves are standard practices for a
large number of law firms.
As to the independent economic value of the client list, the court observed:
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C. Misappropriation
The UTSA defines misappropriation by reference to “improper
means” used to acquire a trade secret,82 which in turn is defined to
include “breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy.”83 For good reason, the definition rather neatly sidesteps questions of ownership of trade secrets. A trade secret right is not an exclusive property right tantamount to ownership of tangible property.84 If it were such an exclusive property right, difficult questions
concerning the true owners of the information (the firm, the lawyers
working with clients, or the client themselves) would demand attention. Instead, trade secret law protects information in the possession
of one party from another party’s acquisition through improper
means, including breach of a confidence.
One can with little difficulty find the requisite duty to maintain
secrecy in many employer-employee relationships. Once again, however, law firms present difficult issues. Is there a difference between
the duties of associates and partners in this regard? Can it be said
that partners are under less of a duty by virtue of their co-ownership
of the firm? Similar questions have been raised with respect to fiduciary duties of partners and associates, and the absence of adequate
responses in that context suggests the issues raised may extend to
questions of partner versus associate use of law firm information.
Because trade secret protection need not turn on ownership of the in[T]he trial court found that the Reeves firm’s client list was confidential data
“developed at great effort and expense over a period of 21 years of practice by
advertising, client intake, representation and the good will developed therefrom
. . . .” This finding is supported by Reeves’s testimony, who indicated that his
firm engaged in a specialized practice, and that his existing clients were a fertile source of new business. In view of this testimony, the trial court could
properly conclude that the client list had independent economic value because
it would allow a competitor to target its efforts to acquire clients.
Id. at *22-23.
82. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (1985).
83. Id. § 1(1).
84. Cf. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917), in
which Justice Holmes noted:
The word ‘property’ as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the
law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever
they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be
denied, but the confidence cannot be. Therefore, the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood
in confidential relations with the plaintiffs or one of them.
The issue of whether trade secrets are property remains a matter of debate as well as artful expression. Compare ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRAM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (1981)
(“Recognition of trade secrets as property is a basic conceptual step from which important
aspects of trade secret law are derived.”), with ALCES & SEE, supra note 8, § 3.4.1, at 84 (“A
trade secret right is not profitably viewed as an exclusive property right to use the trade
secret.”).
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formation or status of the persons who would use it in competition
with the firm, however, there is little reason to draw a distinction between partners and associates in addressing trade secret issues.85
A more fundamental problem exists with broadly treating a law
firm’s client information as a trade secret. Imposing on a particular
lawyer the duty to maintain secrecy of the information necessarily
requires the lawyer to refrain from using or disclosing the information following withdrawal from the firm. This, in turn, impedes the
ability of the lawyer to communicate with and provide services to clients for whom the lawyer worked while at the firm. Such a result
would serve as a direct restraint on competition with the firm and
could undermine significantly the ability of clients to choose their
lawyers.
Given the strength of the principle of client choice, there is little
doubt that information will not be protected when clients effectively
are asked to bear part of the costs of that protection. This is yet another instance of the development of law specially tailored for the legal profession reflecting the unique position of law firm clients
among the larger class of consumers. In any event, perhaps it is concerns with impact on client choice of counsel that explains why in
Siegel the associate’s taking of her rolodex became a nonissue on appeal.86
D. Remedies
The UTSA provides for injunctive relief87 and damages88 as remedies for a misappropriation of trade secrets. In addition, attorney’s
fees may be awarded if a claim of misappropriation is made in bad
faith or in cases of willful and malicious misappropriation.89
The UTSA’s injunctive relief provisions include a variation allowing “[i]n exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty.”90 Use of either traditional injunctive relief or the royalty option in cases of client information, however, will raise the usual concerns on frustration of client’s choice of counsel.91 Royalty payments would add the additional
85. Cf. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(g) (1997) (“A partner may use or possess
partnership property only on behalf of the partnership.”).
86. See also Gibbs v. Breed, Abbott & Morgan, 710 N.Y.S.2d 578, 582 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (finding no breach of fiduciary duty when departing attorneys took desk files comprised of duplicates of information contained in the individual client files).
87. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (1985).
88. Id. § 3.
89. Id. § 4.
90. Id. § 2(b). Exceptional circumstances include “a material and prejudicial change of
position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that renders a
prohibitive injunction inequitable.” Id.
91. See supra notes 39 to 46 and accompanying text.
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complication of fee splitting, which is tightly regulated by the ethics
codes.92
V. TRADE SECRET PROTECTIONS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES COMPARED
Even if firm information falls short of trade secret status, its use
at the time of a lawyer’s withdrawal or thereafter may be restricted
by the fiduciary duties under which partners operate. In Gibbs v.
Breed, Abbott & Morgan,93 for example, the court found the surreptitious recruiting of associates by partners planning to withdraw from
the firm together with the use of information concerning the associates compensation, billing rates, and billable hours constituted an
egregious breach of fiduciary duty they owed their firm:94
Sheehan’s disclosure of confidential BAM data to even one firm
was a direct breach of his duty of loyalty to his partners. Because
the memo gave Chadbourne confidential BAM employment data as
well as other information reflecting BAM’s valuation of each employee, Chadbourne was made privy to information calculated to
give it an unfair advantage in recruiting certain employees.95

The information involved in Gibbs concerned associates rather than
clients, but the case does illustrate that fiduciary duty and trade secret law may operate in similar ways to protect information a law
firm regards as confidential.
Although similar, the relative protections accorded by the two doctrines will vary from case to case. Consider, for example, the associate in Siegel, the trade secret decision discussed earlier.96 On remand, the critical issue for trade secret purposes is whether the firm
took sufficient steps to protect the secrecy of the information. From
the fiduciary perspective, however, the measures the firm took to
protect the information are not an essential element in defining the
duties of the associate while she was at the firm. Instead, if the associate knew the firm regarded the client list as confidential and nevertheless removed it from the firm, she could have breached her duties
as a fiduciary through the mere taking of firm property. Although efforts to preserve secrecy and misappropriation are distinct requirements for trade secret protection, a fiduciary claim may be developed
on the basis of misappropriation (i.e., improper taking) alone. Firms
92. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A) (1982) (allowing fee splitting
only when the client consents, the division is proportionate to the services performed and
responsibilities assumed, and the total fees are not unreasonable). An exception allows fee
splitting when payments are made to a former partner or associate pursuant to a separation agreement. See id. DR 2-107(B). See generally HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 4.6.2.
93. 710 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
94. Id. at 583.
95. Id.
96. See Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio 1999).
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unable to satisfy the secrecy threshold for trade secret protection
thus may still be able to assert claims based on fiduciary duties.
In other respects, however, trade secret protection may be broader
than fiduciary duties. Along this line, a rather ancient agency doctrine addresses the duties of the fiduciary with respect to postwithdrawal use of employer information by allowing the employee to
take and use only the information he has committed to memory. The
Restatement (Second) of Agency describes the post-withdrawal duties
of the agent as
not to use . . . in competition with the principal or to his injury,
trade secrets, written lists of names, or other similar confidential
matters given to him only for the principal’s use . . . . The agent is
entitled to use general information . . . retained in his memory, if
not acquired in violation of his duty as agent[.]97

Although the statement begs the question to some extent by its references both to trade secrets and to information acquired in violation
of a duty, it does make the distinction for fiduciary duty purposes between information taken in documentary form and information that
has been memorized.98 A few courts have concluded memorized information cannot be a trade secret,99 but UTSA seemingly rejects
such a limitation by extending trade secret protection to information.100 The matter is not free from doubt, but at the very least it
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(a) (1958).
98. Cf. Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 513-14 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (noting
that a former employee may use skills and knowledge acquired in the course of employment, provided that written records of compilations are not taken:
Any other rule would force a departing employee to perform a prefrontal lobotomy on himself or herself. It would disserve the free market goal of maximizing
available resources to foster competition . . . . [I]t would not strike a proper balance between the purposes of trade secrets law and the strong policy in favor of
fair and vigorous business competition.).
99. For example, in Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Lab., Inc., 437 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 1993), the
Georgia Supreme Court described the common law distinction between lists containing
customer information and a former employee’s knowledge of customer information, noted
the latter was not a trade secret, and concluded the Georgia Trade Secrets Act did not
change this result. The state statute was subsequently amended to cover information
without regard to form, but it has been held that the amendment applies to tangible forms
of information and not memorized information. See Amerigas Propane, L.P. v. T-Bo Propane, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 685, 697-98 (S.D. Ga. 1997).
100. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985); see also Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Cleveland
Chem. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (“[T]he distinction between information which is written down and that which is memorized has little materiality under Arkansas law. The critical issue is whether the information, whether written or memorized,
is entitled to protection as a trade secret.”), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 82 F.3d 785
(8th. Cir. 1986); cf. Cont. Dynamics Corp. v. Kantor, 408 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978).
Since the names of potential customers were readily ascertainable from public
sources, the defendants’ solicitation of the plaintiff’s customers from casual
memory is not a legally cognizable wrong. However, where customer lists do
not rise to the level of trade secrets, an employee’s ‘physical taking’ or ‘studied
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would seem that use of information committed to memory distinction
is less likely to be less significant for trade secret purposes than it is
for the fiduciary duty analysis.
Another way in which trade secret rights may accord broader protections than fiduciary duties is that the status of trade secret information is not affected by the fact that the individual who has the information has left the firm.101 Fiduciary duties of partners, in contrast, diminish substantially when a partner withdraws from a
firm.102 The same may be said of employees, such as associates, who
are not partners of the firm.103 To be sure, fiduciary duties may be
implicated if the information was acquired by improper means while
the lawyer was still a member of the firm, but in such a case relief is
sought for actions taken prior to departure rather than postwithdrawal competition with the firm.104
VI. A FINAL NOTE: THE ROLE OF CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES
By focusing on the potential trade secret status of client lists, this
Article has emphasized protections imposed by law. Information may
also be protected by contract. For this reason, the UTSA makes clear
that the statutory framework for trade secrets does not displace contractual remedies.105 The Comment adds:
This Act . . . is not a comprehensive statement of civil remedies.
It applies to a duty to protect competitively significant secret information that is imposed by law. It does not apply to a duty voluntarily assumed through an express or implied-in-fact contract.
The enforceability of covenants not to disclose trade secrets and
covenants not to compete that are intended to protect trade secrets, for example, is governed by other law.106

copying’ of such lists may, nevertheless, form the basis for a cause of action for
unfair competition.
Id. (citation omitted).
101. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Breed, Abbott & Morgan, 710 N.Y.S.2d 578, 590 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (Saxe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I conclude that the information
plaintiffs disclosed to Chadbourne should not be treated as a ‘trade secret’ or ‘confidential
matter’ since if it were, a departing attorney might have a continuing obligation not to disclose it . . . .”).
102. Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), for example, upon dissociation a partner’s duty to refrain from competing with the partnership terminates, although
as to matters that arose before the dissociation the partner continues to have duties to account and to refrain from dealing with the partnership as or on behalf of an adverse party.
See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 603(b) (1997).
103. Associates, as employees, have fiduciary duties to their firms.
104. Although the time at which the individual secured the information is an issue under the trade secret analysis, the protections accorded by this area of law are not limited to
relief from actions taken while the partner was at the firm.
105. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b)(1).
106. Id. cmt.
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This allowance of private ordering as a means of defining rights in
information is consistent with a view of fiduciary duties as “unspoken expectations” that, by virtue of their default character, are readily supplanted by explicit agreements among the parties.107
There is an intuitive appeal to deferring to private ordering to establish rights in information.108 This is particularly true when the
parties are lawyers and presumably capable of bargaining on the
subject. The difficulty with deferring to private ordering in establishing rights to information concerning law firm clients is that the results of the bargaining may restrict use of client information in ways
that undermine the ability of clients to freely select their law firms.
As has been discussed in the context of contractual measures as evidence of efforts to maintain secrecy,109 the principle of client choice
operates to restrict private ordering among law partners on such basic matters as restrictive covenants and contractual disincentives to
competition.
Whether the principle of client choice is generally in need of reexamination is beyond the scope of this Article. As long as it remains a
fundamental tenet of legal ethics, the role of private ordering in restricting rights to client information is likely to be extremely limited.

107. See, e.g., J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships: The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 442-43
(1997).
108. Cf. Gibbs v. Breed, Abbott & Morgan, 710 N.Y.S.2d 578, 582 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
(finding that withdrawing partners breached no duties to the firm in taking desk copies of
recent correspondence, apparently without regard to client authorizations: “These [files]
were comprised of duplicates of material maintained in individual client files, the partnership agreement was silent as to these documents, and removal was apparently common
practice for departing attorneys.”) (emphasis added).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.

